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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Phillip Thomas Leonard, Jr., appeals from the dismissal of his petition for post-
conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing, asserting that his trial counsel in the 
underlying criminal case was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
In 2009, a grand jury indicted Leonard for lewd conduct. (R., p.118.) Pursuant to 
a plea agreement, Leonard pied guilty to the charged offense. (R., pp.118-19.) Despite 
the presentence investigator's recommendation for incarceration, the district court 
sentenced Leonard to a unified term of 20 years with five years fixed but retained 
jurisdiction. (R., p.119.) Followlng the period of retained jurisdiction, the Department of 
Correction recommended that the district court relinquish jurisdiction. (Id.) The district 
court relinquished jurisdiction and, pursuant to a pro se Rule 35 motion and the 
stipulation of the parties, reduced the fixed portion of Leonard's sentence to three years. 
(R., pp.119-20.) Leonard waived his right to appeal the amended sentence. (R., 
p.120.) 
Leonard filed a petition for post-conviction relief, asserting that he was deprived 
of due process and equal protection based on the PSl's recommendation for 
incarceration, and that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel, alleging that 
counsel (1) inadequately investigated his case, (2) failed to file a viable motion to 
suppress Leonard's confession, and (3) coerced him into pleading guilty. (R., pp.4-17.) 
After holding an evidentiary hearing and allowing the parties to file closing memoranda 
(see Tr.), the district court entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law (R., pp.117-
1 
39). The district court then dismissed Leonard's petition for post-conviction relief. (R., 
pp.140-41.) Leonard filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.142-44.) 
2 
ISSUE 
Leonard states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Leonard's petition for post-
conviction relief because he proved that he received ineffective assistance 
of counsel due to counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress? 
(Appellant's brief, p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Leonard failed to show error in the district court's dismissal of his petition for 
post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing? 
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ARGUMENT 
Leonard Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Dismissal Of His Petition For 
Post-Conviction Relief Following An Evidentiary Hearing 
A. Introduction 
Leonard asserts that the district court erred in denying his petition for post-
conviction relief, arguing that he established that his trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to file a motion to suppress Leonard's confession. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-16.) 
Leonard has failed to show error. The district court correctly determined that a motion 
to suppress Leonard's confession would not have been granted. Therefore, trial 
counsel was not ineffective for failing to pursue the motion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Because proceedings under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act are civil in 
nature, where there is competent and substantial evidence to support a decision made 
after an evidentiary hearing on an application for post-conviction relief, that decision will 
not be disturbed on appeal. Odom v. State, 121 Idaho 625, 826 P.2d 1337 (Ct. App. 
1992). "A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel presents mixed questions of law 
and fact." Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 921, 828 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Ct. App. 1992) 
(citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)). When considering mixed 
questions of law and fact, the appellate court will defer to the lower court's factual 
findings if those findings are based upon substantial evidence, but wilt exercise free 
review of the application of the relevant law to those facts. Murray, 121 Idaho at 921-
22, 828 P.2d at 1326-27 (citing Young v. State, 115 Idaho 52, 764 P.2d 129 (Ct. App. 
1988)). The credibility of the witnesses, relative weight of the evidence, and the 
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inferences to be drawn therefrom are matters solely within the province of the trial court. 
Monahan v. State, 145 Idaho 872, 874, 187 P.3d 1247, 1249 (Ct. App. 2008). 
C. Leonard Is Not Entitled To Post-Conviction Relief 
"Applications for post-conviction relief under the UPCPA initiate civil proceedings 
in which, like a civil plaintiff, the applicant must prove his or her allegations by a 
preponderance of the evidence." McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 570, 225 P.3d 700, 
703 (2010) (citing Hauschulzv. State, 144 Idaho 834,838,172 P.3d 1109, 1113 (2007); 
I.C.R. 57(c)). Where the petitioner alleges entitlement to relief based upon ineffective 
assistance of counsel, in order to prevail, the petitioner must show that his attorney's 
performance was objectively deficient and that he was prejudiced by that deficiency. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88; Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760-61, 760 P.2d 1174, 
1176-77 (1988). In the context of a claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
file a motion to suppress, "a conclusion that the motion, if pursued, would not have been 
granted by the trial court is generally determinative on both prongs of the Strickland 
test." Hoffman v. State, Idaho 277 P.3d 1050, 1056 (Ct. App. 2012) (citing 
Bowman v. State, 129 Idaho 520, 526, 927 P.2d 910, 916 (Ct. App. 1996)). 
Correctly applying these standards, the district court found that Leonard failed to 
establish that his attorney was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress 
Leonard's confession because the motion was not supportable, and dismissed his 
petition. (R., pp.117-41.) In its Findings of Fact, Conclusions [of] Law and Order on 
Post-Conviction Relief Petition (R., pp.117-39), the district court carefully articulated the 
applicable legal standards and set forth, in detail, the reasons Leonard failed to 
establish any of his many claims. The State adopts the reasoning articulated in this 
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order as its argument on appeal. A copy of the district court's order is hereto attached 
as Append ix A. 
On appeal, Leonard asserts that the district court erred in its conclusion, arguing 
that a motion to suppress Leonard's confession would have prevailed as a matter of 
law. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-16.) Contrary to the applicable legal standards and facts of 
this case, Leonard argues that he requested counsel while in custody and never validly 
waived his invoked right to counsel. (Id.) Leonard's argument fails because he was 
never in custody and therefore could not invoke his Miranda 1 right to counsel, and even 
if he could validly invoke that right, he waived it by requesting to return to the police 
station and give his statement. 
In order to validly invoke Miranda rights, a defendant must be in custody 
equivalent to formal arrest. State v. Hurst, 151 Idaho 430, 436, 258 P.3d 950, 956 (Ct. 
App. 2011 ). Leonard asserts that he was in custody because he spoke to police while 
at the police station, received Miranda warnings prior to a polygraph examination, and 
was given rides between the police station and his home by an officer. (Appellant's 
brief, pp.8-11.) None of these factors clearly demonstrates custody for purposes of 
Miranda. 
To the contrary, mere presence at a police station while talking to police is not 
the equivalent of formal arrest. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 494-95 (1977) 
(suspect not in custody for purposes of Miranda when he voluntarily went to police 
station, was immediately informed that he was not under arrest, and was allowed to 
leave). This case is remarkably similar to Mathiason: Leonard voluntarily went to the 
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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police station in order to take the polygraph examination, and in fact requested that the 
officer drive him there. (R., p.81.) The officer explained that Leonard was not under 
arrest, which Leonard said he understood. (R., p.82.) And Leonard was free to leave at 
any time. In fact, after Leonard failed the polygraph examination and stated that he 
wanted an attorney before he continued speaking with police, the officer took Leonard 
home. (Id.) 
After returning home, the officer recounted, 
Leonard said he felt he should just come and explain to me what had 
really happened. I explained to Leonard that it was his choice to do that 
and I was not making him. Leonard agreed that he was freely choosing to 
come with me back to the police department. I told Leonard at any point 
on the way back he could tell me to stop the vehicle and I would let him 
out. He told me he understood and he wanted to come speak with me at 
the police department. 
(R., p.83.) Leonard then returned to the police station and, after being advised of his 
Miranda rights a third time, confessed. (Id.) Because Leonard was never in custody 
equivalent to formal arrest, Leonard could not validly invoke his Miranda rights. See 
Hurst, 151 Idaho at 436, 258 P.3d at 956. 
Even had Leonard validly invoked his Miranda rights, a motion to suppress his 
confess.ion would still fail because Leonard waived those rights. Leonard not only 
returned to the police station and spoke with officers voluntarily, he actually requested 
to return to the police station and speak with the officers after they had taken him home. 
Where a suspect validly invokes the right to have counsel present during police 
interrogation, and thereafter initiates contact with the police without counsel, that 
suspect has waived his previously invoked right. State v. Salato, 137 Idaho 260, 268-
69, 47 P.3d 763, 771-72 (Ct. App. 2001 ); see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 
7 
485-86 (1981 ). Therefore, even had Leonard validly invoked his right to have counsel 
present during questioning, he waived that right when he initiated contact with the 
police. 
Leonard has failed to establish that his attorney was ineffective for not filing a 
suppression motion which had no chance of success. Leonard has therefore failed to 
show error in the district court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The 
district court's order dismissing that petition should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's dismissal 
of Leonard's petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 25th day of September, 2012. 
Deputy Attorney General 
8 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 25th day of September, 2012, I caused two true 
and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed in the 
United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
ROBYN FYFFE 
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & 
Bartlett, LLP 
PO Box 2772 
Boise, ID 83701 
RJS/pm 
J. SPENCER 
Deputy Attorney General 
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) FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
) LAW AND ORDER ON POST-
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) 
) 
) 
) 
Procedural History 
On August 26, 2010, the petitioner Phillip Thomas Leonard (Leonard) filed a pro se 
Petition for Post Conviction Relief, an Affidavit of Facts in Support of Post Conviction Petition, 
a Mltion to Take Judicial Notice of Criminal Case, a Mltion for Evidentiary Hearing and a 
Motion for Waiver of C01.U1Sel. On September 8, 2010, the court issued an Order Appointing 
Attorney and on September 15, 2010 the court received Leonard's Objection to Appointment of 
Attorney. A status conference was held on October 12, 2010 and at that hearing the court 
appointed conflict counsel, Gordon Petrie, to represent Leonard in this action. The appointment 
of Gordon Petrie was made with Leonard's approval and consent. The State's Answer was filed 
on October 13, 2010. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER ON POST-CONVICTION 
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,. t • • 
On October 14, 2010, the court entered an Order for Transcripts. Also on that date the 
court received the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal. On November 5, 2010 and December 
3, 2010 the court received stipulations from the parties to continue the motion hearing on the 
Motion for Summary Dismissal because the parties had not yet received the transcripts. 
On December 8, 2010, Leonard filed an Objection to the Motion for Summary Dismissal. 
A motion hearing was held on February 1, 2011 and the court denied the State's motion on the 
record. A pre-trial conference was held on March 7, 2011 and the Evidentiary Hearing was held 
on March 31, 2011. Leonard was present and represented by Gordon Petrie. The State was 
represented by Zachary Wesley, Canyon County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney. Leonard testified 
on his own behalf, as did his mother, Jane Leonard. The State called attorney Alex Briggs as its 
only witness. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court allowed the parties additional time to 
submit written closing arguments. Leonard filed a Post-Hearing Memorandum on May 3,2011 
and the State filed a Closing Argument memorandum on May 4, 2011. 
The Criminal Case- CR-20O9-5405--C 
On February 19, 2009, Phillip Thomas Leonard Jr. was charged by Indictment with one 
count of Lewd Conduct with a Minor Under Sixteen, a felony violation ofldaho Code 18-1508. 
He was primarily represented by public defender Alex Briggs in this case. A transcript of the 
grand jury proceedings was prepared. On March 113, 2009, Leonard pled not guilty at bis district 
court arraignment. A Pre-Trial hearing was held on April 27, 2009 and a Pretrial Memorandum 
was completed by both the State and the defense and the matter was retained on the court's trial 
calendar. At the pretrial and at the.time Leonard changed his plea. the court was informed that in 
exchange for guilty plea, the State would agree to follow the PSI recommendation if the psycho-
sexual evaluation assessed that Leonard posed a low to moderate risk to re-offend. On May 18, 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER ON POST-CONVICTION 
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2009, at a status conference, the defendant entered a plea of guilt in exchange for the state's plea 
offer. Prior to entering a plea of guilt, the defendant completed an Acknowledgment of Waiver 
of Rights and Consequences in Plea of Guilty form. A transcript of this hearing was prepared for 
post-conviction purposes. 
At the time of the July 21, 2009 sentencing, the attorney for the state recommended ten 
(10) years fixed followed by ten (10) years indeterminate for a unified sentence of twenty (20) 
years and that the sentence be suspended and Leonard be placed on probation for ten (10) years. 
Leonard's attorney, Mr. Briggs, recommended three (3) to five (5) years fixed with the 
indeterminate portion of the sentence to be set at the discretion of the court. Mr. Briggs also 
recommended probation. The PSI recommended incarceration with the Idaho Board of 
Corrections. The court sentenced the defendant to the custody of the Idaho Department of 
Corrections for a minimum period of confinement of five (5) years followed by a subsequent 
indeterminate period not to exceed fifteen (15) years, for a total unified term of twenty (20) 
years. The court retained jurisdiction over the matter for a period of up to one hundred eighty 
(180) days, A transcript of this hearing was prepared for post-conviction purposes. 
On December 14, 2009 the Idaho Department of Corrections provided the court with an 
addendum to the Pre-Sentence Report recommending the court relinquish jurisdiction over 
Leonard. On January 6, 2010, a reviej hearing was held and the court relinquished jurisdictio! 
over Leonard and imposed the underlying sentence previously imposed at the time of sentencing, 
A transcript ofthis hearing was prepared for post-conviction purposes. On April 8, 2010, the 
defendant filed a pro se Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence and a hearing was held on July 
26, 2010. During the July 26, 2010 motion to reconsider hearing, Leonard was represented by a 
public defender. At that time, upon the stipulation of the parties, the court reduced the fixed 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER ON POST-CONVICTION 
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portion of the defendant's sentence to three (3) years. The defendant waived his right to appeal 
the amended sentence. A transcript of this hearing was prepared for post-conviction purposes. 
Standard of Review 
An application for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding which is civil in nature. 
State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983); Clark v. State, 92 Idaho 827, 
830, 452 P.2d 54, 57 (1969); Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 921, 828 P.2d 1323, 1326 
(Ct.App.1992). However, an application for post-conviction relief differs from a complaint in an 
ordinary civil action. An application must contain much more than a "short and plain statement 
of the claim". It must be verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the 
applicant. Furth.er, affidavits, records or other evidence supporting its allegations must be 
attached, or the application must state why such supporting evidence is not included. I.C. § 19-
4903. In other words, the application must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence 
supporting the allegations, or the application will be subject to dismissal. Id. An application for 
post-conviction relief may be filed at any time within one year from the expiration of the time for 
appeal or from the determination of proceedings following an appeal. I.C. § 19-4902. The court 
finds that Leonard's petition was timely filed. 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary disposition of an applibation for post-
conviction relief either pursuant to the motion of a party or upon the court's own initiative. 
Summary dismissal is the procedural equivalent of summary judgment under l.RC.P. 56. 
Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681,684 (Ct. App. 1999). It is appropriate only when the applicant's 
evidence has raised no genuine issues of material fact that if resolved would entitle the applicant 
to relief. Id. If such a factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER ON POST-CONVICTION 
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Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759, 763 (Ct. App. 1991). However if there is no material issue of 
fact the court can, on its own motion. dismiss without a hearing. I.C. § 19-4906(b ). As noted 
above, the court denied the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal finding that there were issues 
of fact to be resolved a.t an evidentiary hearing. 
Like a plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant must prove by a preponderance of evidence 
the allegations upon which the request for post-conviction relief is based. LC. § 19-4907; Russell 
v. State, 118 Idaho 65, 67 (Ct. App. 1990). It is within the province of the trial court to evaluate 
the credibility of witness and the weight to be given to their testimony as well as to determine 
what inferences are to be drawn from the evidence before the court. Mendiola v. State, 150 
Idaho 345,247 P.3d 210 (Ct. App. 2010), review denied. 
The Petition 
In his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Leonard asserts two grounds upon which he 
seeks relief. The first basis for the petition is a due process and equal protection claim related to 
Leonard's belief that the pre-sentence investigator was biased and Leonard was prejudiced when 
the investigator made recommendations for sentencing that were inconsistent with the findings of 
the psycho-sexual evaluation. The second claim for relief is based on an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim,directed at Alex Briggs, who was a Canyon County ru.Juc Defender assigned to 
Leonard's case. Specifically, Leonard asserts that Briggs failed to properly investigate the case, 
failed to adequately meet with Leonard to discuss the case and/ or plan trial strategy, failed to file 
a viable motion to suppress and coerced Leonard into a guilty plea. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER ON POST-CONVICTION 
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The Evidence 
During the evidentiary hearing, neither the Petitioner Leonard nor the Respondent State 
of Idaho requested the court to take judicial notice pursuant to IRE 203(d) of anything including 
any portion of the record of State ofldaho v. Phillip Thomas Leonard, Jr., Canyon Collllty case 
CR-2009-5405 or any transcripts or the PSI or the PSE or any of the affidavits filed by Leonard 
in this action. Neither party offered any exhibit during the evidentiary hearing. On August 26, 
2010, Leonard acting prose filed concurrent with his petition for post-conviction relief, a written 
Motion To Take Judicial Notice of The Underlying Case asking this court to take judicial notice 
of the above referenced criminal case for the pmpose of considering his petition. In his pro--se 
motion, Leonard specifically requested the court take judicial notice of "the Clerk's Records, 
Transcripts, PSI, PSE and that Exhibits from the underlying criminal case be submitted in this 
action." In his pro-se motion, Leonard specifically asks that transcripts of the following hearings 
in the criminal case be lodged in the post-conviction relief file: 1) Grand Jury proceedings; 2) 
District Court arraignment; 3) Pre-trial hearing; 4) Status conference and change of plea hearing; 
and 4) July 20 and 21 2009 sentencing hearings. 
This record presents the court with an evidentiary dilemma. Did the attorneys wish the 
court to consider any evidence other than the testimony presented during the evidentiary 
h~g? The attorneys' written closing arguments filed May 3rd and 4th 2011 contain references 
to portions of the record of the court other than the trial testimony which suggests to the court 
that the attorneys believed the court should or has taken judicial notice of at least some of the 
court's record or documents referred to in the two cases at issue. IRE 201(c) allows the court to 
take judicial notice of records, exhibits or transcripts from the court file in the same or a separate 
case whether requested or not. IRE 201(d) provides that a party may make an oral or written 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER ON POST-CONVICTION 
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request that the court take judicial notice of records, exhibits or transcripts from the court file in 
the same or separate case. The party requesting the court to take judicial notice shall specifically 
identify the documents or items that the party is requesting the court to consider. IRE 201 (t) 
provides that judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the proceeding. The court is not taking 
judicial notice on its own volition of any matters pursuant to IRE 201 ( c ). The court will not 
substitute its discretionary determination for the parties, decisions on this issue. The court 
interprets Leonard's August 26, 2010 pro-se written Motion To Take Judicial Notice of The 
Underlying Case to reflect his request that the court take judicial notice of the items specifically 
identified therein pursuant to IRE 201 ( d). Therefore the court is taldng judicial notice of the 
following items or documents from the underlying criminal case pursuant to the petitioner's pro-
se August 26, 2010 written Motion To Take Judicial Notice of The Underlying Case: 1) Clerk's 
record; 2) Presentence Investigation report (PSI); 3) Psychosexual Evaluation (PSE); 4) Grand 
Jury proceeding transcript; 5) District Court arraignment transcript; 6) Pre-trial bearing 
transcript; 7) Status conference and change of plea hearing transcript; and 8) July 20 and 21 2009 
sentencing hearing transcripts. These are the only items describt::d with sufficient specificity in 
Leonard's pro-se motion asking the court to take judicial notice that the court concludes it should 
take judicial notice of pursuant to IRE 201(d). 
Findings of Fact 
The petitioner Phillip Thomas Leonard, Jr. 'smother, Jane Louise Leonard initiated 
numerous contacts with the Canyon County Public Defender's office in 2009 while her son was 
incarcerated awaiting resolution of the pending criminal charges of Lewd Conduct with a Minor 
Under the Age of Sixteen filed in Canyon County case CR-2009-5405. Ms. Leonard was 
attempting to communicate with Leonard's assigned public defender, Alex Briggs. She was able 
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to reach Mr. Briggs on one of her attempts. Ms. Leonard wanted to discuss potential witnesses 
including possible alibi witnesses for her son's defense with Mr. Briggs. Ms. Leonard also 
attempted unsuccessfully to obtain copies of discovery materials regarding her son's case from 
the public defender's office. There was no evidence presented on whether adequate informed 
consent pursuant to IRPC rule 1.6 had been given by Leonard to the public defender's office to 
discuss the particulars of his case with Ms. Leonard although the petitioner's trial testimony 
suggested that expectation. In response to her inquiries, Mr. Briggs advised Ms. Leonard that the 
petitioner had already admitted that he committed the offense. 
The petitioner was represented in court on the underlying criminal charge by four 
different attorneys from the public defender's office. Although he testified that it was three 
different public defenders, the clerk's record reflects that it was four. Marco DeAngelo 
represented him during his district court arraignment on March 13, 2009. Lance Fuisting 
represented him during a bond reduction hearing April 10, 2009. Alex Briggs represented him 
during his pre-trial hearing April 27, 2010, his status conference/change of plea hearing May 18, 
2009 and during his sentencing on July 21, 2009. Dayo Onanubosi represented him at his first 
sentencing hearing July 20, 2009, which hearing was simply continued to the following day. 
Dayo Onanubosi and Lance Fuisting responded to the Petitioner's inquiries to them about 
the merits of his case by advising mnJ he should discuss the matter with the attorney assignJto 
his case, Alex Briggs. The petitioner discussed his case with Alex Briggs on four or more 
occasions. Mr. Briggs met with him at the jail on April 28, 2009 for somewhere between fifteen 
minutes and an hour and talked to him by telephone approximately two weeks later. In addition, 
Alex Briggs met with and represented Leonard during the Status Conference/Change of Plea 
hearing and during his July 21, 2009 sentencing. Mr. Briggs opined that he met with Leonard 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER ON POST-CONVICTION 
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several occasions including twice at the jail and once on the telephone. This was in addition to 
conversing with hlm in court. Mr. Briggs was unable to verify the number of times they met due 
to bis lack of a file. 
Although he requested, Leonard was never able to review the entire public defender file 
in this case. He reviewed a portion of the state,s discovery responses that covered his police 
interview, admissions and confession with Mr. Briggs. 
Leonard initially advised Mr. Briggs that he wanted to take the criminal case to trial. Mr. 
Briggs advised Leonard that in light of his confession, he would probably lose his case if it was 
taken to jury trial. Leonard advised Alex that he invoked his right to consult with an attorney at 
some point during his conversation with law enforcement and that he felt his confession may be 
suppressible. Leonard provided Mr. Briggs with names of some of his friends who may have 
been able to provide an alibi for Leonard on the dates the o:ff ense allegedly occurr~ being 
sometime between December 3 and December 10 2008. Leonard asked Mr. Briggs to investigate 
the case to see what he could do to help him and have an awareness of his side of the case. 
Leonard confessed to committing the offense in this case after he had advised the 
investigating law enforcement officers that he wanted to talk to an attorney. He opined that he 
made the confession because he was stressed by the potential of the charges that might be filed 
against him and confessed~ust to make the law enforcement officer's go away. Mf. Briggs 
reviewed the police interview and determined the confession was not suppressible. A review of 
discovery documents attached to the PSI indicate that Leonard was mirandized and returned 
home after he stated he wanted an attorney prior to changing bis mind and asking the officers 
take him back to the police station so he could tell them the truth. Leonard volunteered to retum 
to the police station to make a statement after he had been taken home by the officers. He was 
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not in police custody at that point and understood his right to remain silent and to be represented 
by an attorney. He waived his right to an attorney and voluntarily returned to the police 
department to make a revised statement in which he confesses to committing this crime. Neither 
attorney called the investigating officers as witnesses at the post-conviction relief trial. Leonard 
asked the court to take judicial notice of the PSI which contained this information. 
Mr. Briggs advised Leonard that if he went to trial and lost, he may face a harsher 
sentence than ifhe took advantage of the plea agreement being offered by the state. In light of 
Mr. Brigg's opinion that the confession was not suppressible and the possibility that he may face 
a harsher sentence ifhe proceeded to trial and lost, Leonard chose to plead guilty. At the status 
conference, Leonard asked Mr. Briggs if there was anything else they could do to obtain a better 
deal. Mr. Briggs responded in the negative so Leonard pied guilty. The State agreed to release 
Leonard ifhe pled at the status conference which provided him additional incentive to enter the 
plea. 
Leonard entered a guilty plea May 18, 2009. As part of the process of entering the guilty 
plea, Leonard filled out a written guilty plea form referred to as "Acknowledgement of Waiver of 
Rights and Consequences in Plea of Guilty" which document was filed May 18, 201 I. The court 
also orally reviewed Leonard's guilty plea with him on the record. Leonard's May 18, 2009 
guilty plea fully]complied with the requirements oflCR 11. During his ~ntry of the guilty plea, 
Leonard never advised the court that he was reluctant to enter the plea, that he was being coerced 
or that he did not commit the offense he was pleading guilty too. To the contrary, Leonard 
appeared rational, emotionally stable and acting with complete knowledge and voluntariness. 
Even though Leonard was given many opportunities to express his reluctance or any concern that 
he bad that he was being coerced, he did not. The court reviewed with Leonard the fact that in 
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entering hls plea, he was giving up the right to file a motion to suppress evidence in this case 
including any confession. He acknowledged that waiver and never indicated that he wanted to 
challenge his confession. Leonard testified he was being coerced by Mr. Briggs who told him 
what to say. Mr. Briggs acknowledged that often the defense attorney will review and discuss 
the process of entering the plea with their clients. Like'\\ise, the defense attorney will sometimes 
consult with the client and give them advice on questions asked during the entry of a plea. Mr. 
Briggs denied that he coerced Leonard into pleading guilty. Had Leonard expressed a reluctance 
to enter the plea at the time of the status conference, Mr. Briggs would have asked for a 
continuance. At the ti.me he entered his plea, Mr. Briggs advised Leonard tbat he would likely 
get probation or at most a retained jurisdiction. The court advised him that the court could 
impose any sentence allowed under the law at the time he entered his plea. 
Mr. Briggs was employed by the Canyon County Public Defender's Office between 2001 
and 2009. He was handling close to l 00 active cases at the time he represented Mr. Leonard. 
Mr. Briggs advised Leonard that he should probably take advantage of the State's plea bargain 
offer in this case that resulted in Leonard's guilty plea on the basis of his review of the evidence 
in the file. Mr. Briggs specifically reviewed the evidence of Leonard's confession to law 
enforcement. He was aware that Leonard requested counsel at some point in the interview. Mr. 
Brig~ had determined that Leonard was not in custody wheJ he made his confession and that 
the confession was made under such circumstances that it did not raise suppression issue. Mr. 
Briggs also concluded and advised Leonard that it would not be appropriate to assert an Alibi 
defense when he had confessed to committing the crime. Mr. Briggs likely advised Leonard that 
he should accept responsibility for the offense he committed during the presentence 
investigation, psychosexual evaluation and sentencing. Mr. Briggs did not advise Leonard to lie 
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to the court or the evaluators in this case. Mr. Briggs did not recall Leonard advising him that he 
wanted to go to trial. He would have advised him that electing to proceed to trial was not a good 
idea and explained why. Although Mr. Briggs acknowledged that he may have in the past 
advised someone to plead guilty to an offense that they may not be guilty of to take advantage of 
a plea bargain (such as pleading to a misdemeanor to avoid a felony), Mr. Briggs did not recall 
ever recommending to a person that they plead guilty to a serious offense, such as the charge in 
this case when he did not believe they were guilty of the offense. 
Leonard admitted that he committed the charged offense to the investigating law 
enforcement officers during his pre-indictment interview. He admitted that he committed the 
offense at the time he pled guilty. He admitted he committed the offense during his pre~sentence 
investigation report interview. He admitted he committed the offense during his psychosexual 
report interview. He admitted he committed the offense during his retained jurisdiction 
treatment and during the retained jurisdiction review hearing. He apologized to the victim at the 
time of his sentencing and during the retained jurisdiction hearing. Leonard never asserted that 
he was innocent of the charges at the time he filed an ICR 35 motion after this court relinquished 
jurisdiction. The first time he advised the court he was not guilty of the offense ·was in this post-
conviction relief proceeding. Mr. Briggs was a more credible witness than Mr. Leonard during 
I 
the post~conviction relief trial. During the trial Mrj Leonard was recalled to the stand and he 
testified that he advised the public defender representing during the retained jurisdiction review 
hearing (Mr. William Swartz) that he wanted to appeal this court's relinquishment ofjmisdiction 
although that claim has never been raised in any of bis post-conviction relief pleadings. 
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Due Process and Equal Protection rights violation claim based on the pre-sentence 
investigator's recommendation 
In his petition, Leonard alleges that he was deprived of the right to due process under the 
Fifth Amendment and equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment because the 
presentence investigator was biased and prejudicial in the conclusions and recommendations 
made prior to his sentencing. Other than his petition, Leonard has not provided additional 
argument or authority or evidence in support of his claim, and the State has argued that Leonard 
abandoned this claim and it should be denied. 
In bis petition, Leonard cites to State v. Aspeytia, 130 Idaho 12, 936 P .2d 210 (Ct. App. 
1997) in which the Idaho Court of Appeals considered a claim by a defendant that the 
presentence investigator included racially biased comments in the presentence investigation 
report, and that the report was incomplete. The defendant argued that bis attorney was 
ineffective for failing to object to the report. The appellate court found that the report was 
substantially complete and that it was not ineffective assistance of counsel for his attorney not to 
object to the report on those grounds. In addition, the court found that the sentencing judge had 
properly dealt with the alleged racially biased comments because the judge had stated on the 
record that to the extent that the report juld be considered to be biased, that the judge would nof 
consider the objectionable statements. The appellate court found no error in the sentencing 
judge's response to the defendant's arguments. Id. 
In this case, the court finds that at the time of sentencing, Mr. Briggs did state on the 
record his smprise at the presentence investigator's sentencing recommendation because as he 
stated: 
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I think that she let her personal viewpoints get in the way of her professional 
opinion on what should be done in this case. Worst case scenario, she should 
have recommended a retained jurisdiction. I think that's clear based on the 
psychosexual evaluation. Had she come in and recommended the retained 
jurisdiction, that wouldn't have been surprising. But I think just the 
recommendation to go straight to the penitentiary, I think is- it shows that she 
personally - she bad too much personal feeling about this case for whatever 
reason. 
(July 21, 2009 Transcript, page 34, 11. 6-18). 
This court then stated the following: 
I have carefully considered the presentence investigation report and psychosexual 
evaluation, the arguments of the attorneys presented here in court, the corrections 
noted, the statement by the defendant, I do not have a victim impact statement, 
and I have the prosecutor's explanation about their concerns for the victim. 
(July 21, 2009 Transcript, page 43, ll. 5-10). 
This court finds that absent specific argument detailing Leonard's objections and alleged 
violation of his rights, the court is left to consider the record before it At the time of sentencing, 
Mr. Briggs expressed his concern that the incarceration recommendation of the pre-sentence 
investigator lacked objectivity and appeared to reflect the pre-sentence investigator's personal 
prejudice. Toe Court noted and considered Mr. Briggts concerns over the pre-sentence 
investigator's recommendation. In expressing his concern about the presentence investigation 
report, Leonard has not pointed to particular information contained in the report which he 
contends unconstitutionally prejudiced him or violated the standards and procedures governing 
presentence investigatio, and reports as set forth in ICR 32. ICR 32 allows re presentence 
investigator to recommend incarceration, but not a specific recommendation as to the length of 
incarceration. In this case, the presentence investigator recommended incarceration, but did not 
recommend a particular length of incarceration. The pu,sentence investigation report should not 
contain conjecture or speculation. ICR 32(e)(l). Leonard has not identified any particular 
information in the presentence investigation report which he contends is conjecture or 
speculation. The record evinces that the court considered not only the recommendations of the 
-
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presentence investigation report but all the other information properly before the court about the 
defendant, the victim, and the crime including the recommendations of Leonard's attorney and 
Leonard's statement before he was sentenced. In addition, the record also demonstrates that the 
court did not follow the recommendation of the PSI. The court chose to retain jurisdiction over 
Leonard for 180 days to allow Leonard the opportunity to participate in rehabilitative 
programing available in the retained jurisdiction program and to demonstrate his amenability to 
community supervision and treatment. Leonard's inability to successfully complete the retained 
jurisdiction program resulted in the court relinquishing jurisdiction. Leonard has failed to 
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence presented at the March 31, 2011 evidentiary 
hearing on his petition for post-conviction relief that his constitutional rights including the 
specifically alleged Hdue process" and "equal protection" rights were somehow violated by the 
pre-sentence investigator's recommendation for incarceration with the Idaho Board of 
Corrections. Leonard has failed to meet his burden of proof on this issue. Leonard's claim for 
post-conviction relief on the basis that his due process and equal protection rights were denied as 
a result of the pre-sentence investigator's recommendation is denied. 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel claim 
In bis petition, Leonard alleges that he is entitled to- post-conviction relief due to the 
ineffective ass~ce of his court appointed attorney, Alex Briggs. r,Jnard alleged the 
ineffective assistance of his attorney violated his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth 
amendments to the Constitution of the United States and under Article I, Section 13 of the 
Constitution of the State of Idaho. As an initial matter, the court notes that the public defender 
file from this action was not available to his previous public defender, Mr. Briggs prior to the 
evidentiary hearing because of a change in the service provider under the public defender 
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contract, but Mr. Briggs testified th.at he reviewed the available copies of discovery from the 
criminal case prior to the evidentiary hearing. Leonard's ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
was based on the following allegations: 
1. Leonard alleges that bis attorney failed to adequately investigate his case by failing 
to spend sufficient time discussing the case with him, by failing to adequately 
disclose and review pre-trial discovery with him and by failing to adequately 
investigate and assert a potential alibi defense. 
2. Leonard also alleges that his attorney failed to file a viable pre-trial motion to 
suppress admissions and/or confessions made by him. 
3. Leonard alleges that his attorney coerced hlm into pleading guilty. 
In an Ineffective Assistance of Counsel claim, a defendant must satisfy the two prong test 
that: 1) his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and 2) 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the results of the proceedings 
would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687~688 (1984). The 
benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so 
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as 
having produced a just result. Id at 686. See State 11. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137, cert 
den*d, 493 U.S. 922 (1989); see also Gibson 11. State, 11d Idaho 631 (1986); Paradis v. State, 
110 Idaho 534 (1986); Carter v. State, 108 Idaho 788 (1985). To prevail on an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must show that the attorney's performance was 
deficient, and that the defendant was prejudiced by the deficiency. Jakoski v. State, 136 Idaho 
280, 284 (Ct. App. 2001 ). To establish a deficiency, the applicant has the burden of showing that 
the attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Aragon v. State, 
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114 Idaho 758, 760 (1988). To establish prejudice, the applicant must show a reasonable 
probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would have 
been different. Id at 761. The Idaho Supreme Court bas stated that the strategic and tactical 
decisions made by trial counsel are not a basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
unless a showing can be made that such decisions arose out of a lack of preparation, ignorance of 
relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective review. State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 
355, _J 247 P.3d 582, 610 (2010). Because there is a strong presumption that an attorney's 
performance falls within "the wide range of professional assistance" the burden is on the 
defendant to show a "reasonable probability" that a different result was likely and that prejudice 
resulted from counsel's actions. Id. 
Failure to adequately investigate allegation including a possible Alibi defense. 
One of the issues raised by Leonard with respect to his ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim was Leonard's claim that Mr. Briggs failed to properly investigate the case. Leonard 
alleged both in his affidavits and during his testimony that he attempted to provide alibi witness 
information to Mr. Briggs but that nothing came of the information. Mr. Briggs testified that he 
did not feel it would have been appropriate to file a Notice of Alibi given the fact that Leonard 
bad confessed to the crime during the investigation of the matter. Leonard also contends that Mr. 
Briggs failed to provide Leonard with complete c~pies of the public defender's file including the 
State's discovery responses and thus, Leonard was unable to help Mr. Briggs determine what 
information might be missing from the file. He also argues that he would have been able to help 
Mr. Briggs investigate an alibi defense that would prove that he did not commit the crime, as 
well as being able to show f?at bis confession was derived from a desire to escape the interview 
and not because he was actually guilty. Mr. Briggs testified that he did not recall exactly what 
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discovery was provided to Leonard, but that his practice would have been to give the defendant 
the requested discovery. The trial evidence presented in this case demonstrates that Mr. Briggs 
conducted pretrial discovery, reviewed it with Leonard prior to bis change of plea and that he 
made a tactical decision not to present an Alibi defense in light of Leonard's confession that he 
committed the offense charged. The court concludes that Leonard has failed to prove by a 
preponderance of the trial evidence that he was denied effective assistance of counsel on the 
issue of investigation of the case, disclosure of discovery or investigation of the purported Alibi 
defense. In reaching this conclusion, the court has .determined that Leonard failed to prove his 
case by a preponderance of the evidence under both prongs of the Strickland test Leonard failed 
to prove that Mr. Brigg's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 
Leonard failed to prove that there is a reasonable probability that, but for Mr. Brigg's alleged 
errors, the results of the proceedings would have been different. 
Failure to file a motion to suppress 
A second issue raised by Leonard is Mr. Briggs' failure to file a motion to suppress. 
Leonard testified that he believed that he had a valid motion to suppress based on the fact that he 
had asked for the assistance of coimsel during the interview by law enforcement, that no attorney 
was provided to him, and that he later confessed. In addition. Leonard testified that he got sea.red 
dwing the interview and told law enfJrcement what he thought they wanted to hear in orderlto 
end the interview. He testified that he informed Mr. Briggs of this fact and that Mr. Briggs failed 
to take any action on this information. Mr. Briggs testified that he reviewed the discovery in this 
case including specifically the discovery relevant to Leonard's confession. Mr. Briggs 
determined that there was not a valid argument for suppression of Leonard's confession. A 
separate review of the information attached to the PSI which Leonard asked this court to 
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consider, confirms that the confession objected to by Leonard was freely and voluntarily given 
by Leonard after he had received Miranda warnings while he was not in custody. Leonard had 
been transported home by the investigating officers after he failed a polygraph and asked for an 
attorney. He thereafter volunteer"'...d to return Vti.th the officers to the police station to provide a 
confession. He was reminded at this juncture that he was not in custody and could leave when 
he v.i.shed. He was then transported back to the police station where he was again given his 
Miranda rights before he confessed. Even though he had previously asked for an attorney, when 
the officers transported Leonard home in response, Leonard voluntarily offered to return with 
them to the police station to tell them the accurate story about what happened. They told him he 
was not in custody and could change his mind at any time and they would return him home. In 
contrast to Leonard's assertion, the post-conviction trial evidence supports Mr. Briggs 
assessment and tactical decision not to file a motion to suppress in this case. 
Leonard has not proven by a preponderance of the trial evidence that Mr. Brigg,s 
decision not to file a motion to suppress Leonard's confession constituted ineffective assistance 
of counsel. In reaching this conclusion, the court has determined that Leonard failed to prove his 
case by a preponderance of the evidence under both prongs of the Strickland test. Leonard failed 
to prove that Mr. Brigg's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, 
Leonard failed to prove ~ there is a reasonable probability that, but for Mr. Brlgg's alleged 
errors, the results of the proceedings would have been different. 
Leonard's contention that his guilty plea was coerced. 
Leonard has claimed that he was coerced by Mr. Briggs into pleading guilty, In 
evaluating such a claim, the court notes that in order for a plea of guilt to be valid it must be 
voluntary, and voluntariness requires that the defendant understand the nature of the charges of 
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which he is pleading guilty. State v Mayer, 139 Idaho 643,647 (Ct. App. 2004). In addition, the 
court must find that the defendant knowingly and intentionally waived his rights to a jury trial, to 
confront adverse witnesses, and to avoid self-incrimination and that he defendant understood the 
consequences of pleading guilty. State v Huffman, 137 Idaho 886, 887 (Ct. App. 2002). The 
court must look to the record, and draw all reasonable inference from the record as a whole. 
State v. Izzard, 136 Idaho 124, 29 P.3d 960 (Ct. App. 2001). Finally, the court when accepting a 
plea of guilt must ensure that the record complies with Idaho Criminal Rule 11 ( c), Id. 
In this case, Leonard does not challenge the court's method or thoroughness in taking his 
plea of guilt. Rather, Leonard contends that a combination of the factors led him to believe that 
he had no choice but to plead guilty in order to take advantage of the plea bargain offered by the 
State. He testified that he took the plea deal, not because he wanted to plead guilty, but because 
he was told by Mr. Briggs that going to trial would mean facing a harsher sentence upon 
conviction. When questioned about the circumstances of his guilty plea, Leonard testified that 
he said what he was told to say by Mr. Briggs including admitting guilt for the crime and not 
objecting when questioned by the court about whether he agreed that there were no viable 
suppression issues. In addition, Leonard testified that at the time of sentencing and at subsequent 
hearings, he made apologies to the victim and acknowledged his guilt in order to encourage 
leniency by the ~wt. Finally, Leonard contends that he admitted guilt lduring the pre-sentence 
investigation and during the psycho-sexual evaluation because Mr. Briggs told-him he needed to 
accept responsibility for his offense to encourage leniency by the court. 
Mr. Briggs acknowledged that he encouraged Leonard to take advantage of the plea offer 
by the State due to Leonard's confession and very low chance of success at trial. He opined that 
it was better to take the plea agreement with its favorable sentencing recommendations in this 
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case then to risk the possibility of a harsher sentencing recommendation and sentence after trial. 
Mr. Brigg's affirmed that it was his practice to inform defendants who plead guilty to sex abuse 
crimes that it is best to accept responsibility during the pre-sentence and psychosexual evaluation 
phase of the case in order to demonstrate remorse and to avail them of the best possible sentence 
from the court. Mr. Briggs believed that it would be malpractice for an attorney not to inform a 
client of this information in sex abuse type cases. 
In reviewing the record of the underlying criminal case and having taken judicial notice 
of the clerk's record, the PSI, the PSE, the transcripts requested by the Defendant file, the court 
finds the following. First, the defendant completed the Acknowledgment of Waiver of Rights 
and Consequences in Plea of Guilty form. This form details the various rights afforded to a 
criminal defendant and requires the defendant to make a showing that he or she understands such 
rights, as well as understands that such rights are being waived by the plea of guilt. Next, the 
court finds that at the change of plea hearing held on May 18, 2009 that the court carefully 
reviewed the form and the waiver of rights v.ith the defendant. At no time during that hearing 
did Leonard express a concern about the process, the rights being waived, or the representations 
being made by his attorney at that hearing. In addition, at that hearing, Leonard made an 
admission to the crime charged and that he believed that his plea was in fact freely and 
volun~y given. At the July 21, 2009 sentencing hearing, ~nard apologized to the victim 
stated ''I do regret what happened, and I wish I really could take back time and this would not 
have happened." (July 21, 2009, page 39, l. 25, page 40, l. 1). 
An additional consideration for the court is the factual basis for the plea of guilt. The 
court has reviewed the grand jury transcript testimony and the pre-sentence investigation report 
including the police reports attached that details the polygraph results and the nature and 
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circumstances of the confession made by the defendant during the investigation and the 
defendant's ovm. written statement about this offense. Based upon the evidence in the record, the 
court finds that there is a substantial factual basis for the guilty plea entered by the petitioner in 
this case. Other than his allegations which were asserted for the first time as part of this post-
conviction relief proceeding, there is no credible evidence of record that Mr. Briggs coerced 
Leonard into pleading guilty in this case. 
Leonard has not proven by a preponderance of the trial evidence that Mr. Brigg's coerced 
him into pleading guilty or that Mr. Brigg's conduct in encouraging the plea of guilt constituted 
ineffective assistance of counsel. In reaching this conclusion, the court has determined that 
Leonard failed to prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence under both prongs of the 
Strickland test. Leonard failed to prove that Mr. Brigg's performance fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness. Leonard failed to prove that there is a reasonable probability that, 
but for Mr. Brigg's alleged errors, the results of the proceedings would have been different. 
During the trial, Leonard testified that he asked the attorney representing him during the 
retained jurisdiction review hearing to appeal this court's relinquishment of jurisdiction. This 
evidence will not be considered by the court because that issue was never pled or identified by 
the petitioner prior to the trial. 
Conclusions of Law and Order 
For the reasons set forth above, the court concludes that Leonard has failed to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence presented to the court that he is entitled to an order granting him 
post-conviction relief pursuant to Title Nineteen, Chapter 49 of the Idaho Code. Phillip Thomas 
Leonard's conviction and sentence in Canyon County Case CR-2009-5405 remains in effect. 
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This post--conviction proceeding shall be dismissed on the basis that the petitioner has failed to 
meet bis burden of proof. The attorney for the State of Idaho shall within fourteen days prepare 
and submit to the court a proposed final judgment in compliance ,vith IRCP 54(a) 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Toe undersigned certifies that on d---/ day of June, 2011, s/he served a true and correct copy of 
the original of the foregoing ORDER ON SUMMARY DISPOSITION on the following 
individuals in fhe manner described: 
• upon counsel for petitioner: 
Gordon W. Petrie 
Attorney at Law 
1009 W. Sanetta Street 
Nampa, Idaho 83651 
• and upon counsel for the State: 
Zachary J. Wesley 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
1115 Albany 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
and/or whens/he deposited each a copy of the foregoing ORDER in the U.S. Mail with sufficient 
postage to individuals at the addresses listed above. 
CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the Court 
~:-~~---A----~----v~urt 
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